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Abstract
We provide a novel model of executives in parliamentary democracies that accounts
for key features of these institutions: decision-making authority is assigned to in-
dividual ministers; and policy relevant information is aggregated through commu-
nication between politicians. Politicians hold idiosyncratic biases and have private
information relevant either to all policies or to a subset of them. When their in-
formation is relevant to all policies and communication takes place in private all
decisions should be centralised to a single politician. A government that holds cabi-
net meetings, where any information communicated to one minister is made available
to all, outperforms one where communication is private: a multi-member cabinet
can then be optimal. We study the optimal form of authority allocation and find (i)
that centralisation is non-monotonic in the degree of ideological divergence between
politicians; and (ii) the cabinet need not be single peaked around the most moderate
politician, and in fact may not even be ideologically connected. In a large cabinet,
however, all power should be centralised to the most moderate politician. In the
case where uncertainty is policy specific, and a single politician is informed on each
policy, power should never be fully decentralised. In fact numerical simulations show
that the optimal executive structure is no less centralized than in the common-state
case. Our model provides a justification for centralised authority and the use of
cabinet meetings to enhance the quality of policies implemented.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between the President, Congress, and its committees, has been the subject of
numerous theoretical studies, but the allocation of decision-making authority in a parliamentary
democracy is less well understood. This might reflect the fact that such authority is not clearly
codified in these systems. For example, central governance in the United Kingdom is underpinned
by several piecemeal and unwritten conventions: the role of the Prime Minister and Cabinet have no
constitutional status and both arose due to historical circumstance, practice, and convention. Even
when the role of those with executive authority is codified– as in Germany, where article 65 of the
Basic Law defines the status of the chancellor, cabinet and ministers– the constitution is typically
silent about how the executive should be structured and the relations between its decision-makers.
In the absence of constitutional guidelines that define a clear game form, we propose a new model
that incorporates common and distinguishing features of executive governance in parliamentary
democracies. The first is that decision-making authority over different policies is assigned to indi-
vidual ministers who head state departments. The second is the existence of a cabinet: the set of
ministers who hold executive office meet at a designated time and place where policy-relevant in-
formation, obtained through discussion and debate both outside and inside the chamber, is shared.
Though we restrict to the set of institutions that allow for assignment of authority to individuals
with collective deliberation over outcomes, we nevertheless address two core aspects of optimal
executive structure in parliamentary democracies.
First, and central to our investigation, is the role of the cabinet. It has been been studied historically
as an efficient means of rationalising parliamentary activity Cox (1987), and more formally as a
system of incentives operated by a Prime Minister (Dewan and Myatt, 2007; Indridason and Kam,
2008; Dewan and Myatt, 2010). To our knowledge, however, no model exists that assesses the role
of cabinet meetings. There are several practical justifications for such meetings: they are necessary
for a collective decision-making body that votes, though few real world cabinets have explicit voting
procedures; they are one of several bodies that help coordinate executive activities;1 and they enable
collective responsibility, by which the policies implemented by ministers are those of the government
and have the support of all ministers. We assess the impact of cabinet meetings on the quality
of policies that are implemented by the executive. A key principle of cabinet government is that
1see for example Saalfeld (2000), pages 60-63.
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significant policy issues that fall within the remit of a minister’s portfolio should be discussed in
cabinet. We contrast the quality of policy outcomes obtained when this principle is upheld with
that when cabinet meetings are replaced by informal modes of communication, such as private
conversations between policymakers and politicians.
Second, we address the extent to which power in cabinet should be centralised. In the United King-
dom, for example, a longstanding controversy exists “about whether monocratic control is exercised
by the premier” reflecting “normative anxieties about Britain’s unbalanced constitution”(Dunleavy
and Rhodes, 1990). Similarly in Germany, key constitutional principles that guide the allocation
of authority often conflict with one another so the “question of whether an issue falls under a de-
partmental minister’s competence or the Chancellor’s right to determine the government’s policy is
sometimes ambiguous”(Saalfeld (2000), page 51). In the absence of clear constitutional guidelines,
we study how the allocation of power affects the quality of the final decisions implemented.
We relate this quality to the amount of policy relevant information that decision-makers have at
their disposal. As in classic models of information going back to Condorcet, and more recently
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), in our model there is uncertainty over the best policy to pursue.
This is related to corresponding uncertainty about underlying fundamentals: different prognosis
about economic growth might affect the optimal policies on public spending, defence, and immigra-
tion, for example. We assume that information about such fundamentals is dispersed amongst the
set of politicians who are the players in our game. Differences in a politician’s private information
might reflect differences in his information sources: a politician forms a viewpoint based on his
local understanding, research, or the views of interest groups. We impose a coarse information
structure that arguably provides a more accurate depiction of the information obtained from such
sources. For example a politician may observe whether a national recession has had an impact on
his constituency or not that impacts his preferences over economic and social policy.
Specifically we develop a game-theoretic model where there are a set of politicians and issues to be
decided. The game has three stages: first, politicians receive private information that is relevant
either to all policies or to a subset of them; next, politicians use simultaneous cheap talk messages
to convey their information to ministers; who then, finally, implement policies. Politicians–we
might think of these as members of a governing majority–share a common goal of implementing
well informed policies. But they hold different beliefs as to the best policy to pursue. These
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differences stem from the variation in their information sources as well as idiosyncratic biases that
reflect their world-view, or those of their constituents, and can prohibit the truthful revelation of
private information to a decision-maker. We ask whether variation in the executive structure–how
centralised it is, who has authority, and whether cabinet meetings are held–impacts on the strategic
communication of this policy relevant information.
Communication may be affected by the way authority is allocated: a politician may be truthful
when the issue is decided by one minister, while not doing so when it is decided by another. It may
also be that a politician is truthful when a minister has control over one issue but not when she has
more authority. To explore this issue, and with the restriction that the power to finally determine
each policy is in the hands of a single minister, we allow for all allocations: at one extreme all
politicians could share authority; at the other all power could be centralised to a single minister;
alternatively power might be shared, either equally or unequally, between a cabinet of ministers.2
The structure of communication can also have consequences. We assume that at cabinet meetings
any information available to one minister, and upon which he consequently bases his decision, is
made available to all ministers. This contrasts with a situation where communication with ministers
is private and creates different incentives for strategic communication. Notably, without cabinet
meetings a politician could convey a different message to each decision maker, whilst this is not
possible with them. A politician may then choose to be truthful only when talking in confidence
with a minister. Or, by the same token, truthful communication may be made possible by the fact
that information is shared. We contrast a world with cabinet meetings to one where communication
between a minister and a politician takes place only in private.
We first show that under all circumstances of our model (any allocation of authority, communication
structure, and whether a minister’s private information is specific to all policies or a subset of
them) ex-ante welfare depends on two features: the moderation of decision-makers that minimizes
aggregate ideological loss; and their information that reduces the aggregate residual variance of
decisions implemented. Our first main result shows that in the absence of cabinet meetings and
when politicians private information is relevant to the entire set of policies to be implemented, the
optimal assignment involves fully centralised power exercised by a unique individual. With cabinet
2In the United Kingdom, for example, decision-making authority has been centralized in a cabinet dominated by the
prime minister since the late 19th century, whereas during Parliament’s previous “golden age” power as more equally
dispersed amongst individual members of Parliament (see Cox (1987) for a discussion of the emergence of centralized
authority in Victorian England).
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meetings it may instead prove optimal for decision-making authority to be shared between ministers.
A politician may be unwilling to communicate truthfully to a single leader who is ideologically
distant, while being truthful when power is shared with another cabinet member whose ideology is
intermediate. This apparently innocuous observation leads to a powerful normative result: cabinet
meetings outperform private communication as a form of information aggregation and so leads to
more informed policies being implemented. This central result holds whether private conversations
can be held outside of cabinet or not.
Next we characterize the optimal degree of centralisation in a cabinet and show, surprisingly, that it
is nonmonotonic in the ideological divergence between politicians. When it is small then ideological
disagreement does not prohibit information aggregation and so it is better that a moderate executive
leader emerges. When it is large then politicians are unable to communicate truthfully with another
and so full centralisation to a moderate leader is desirable. For intermediate values, however,
information aggregation is sensitive to the allocation of authority. Then it is better that power is
shared in a multi-member cabinet.
Analyzing the allocation of authority further we find that such a cabinet need not be ideologically
connected: when two politicians with different ideology share power then there may be a politician
with intermediate ideology who has none. The finding that the optimal allocation of authority may
involve such “holes” contrasts with the connected-winning coalitions in Axelrod (1970). A similar
prediction arises in models of complete information where bargaining takes place over policies and
portfolio allocation (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988) and so our results can be seen as providing a
corresponding and novel information aggregation rationale for non-connected executive coalitions.
We then consider the limit case of a large cabinet and show that all decision making authority
should be concentrated to politicians who are ideologically close to the most moderate one. In
an appendix we perform numerical simulations–randomly drawing ideology profiles and calculating
the optimal policy assignment–of an intermediately sized parliament. We find that fully centralized
authority is fairly frequent, and that, when it is optimal for authority to be shared, a single minister
(perhaps a Prime Minister) should be assigned a large share (on average, at least 80 %) of decisions.
Our results where information is relevant to all policies and widely dispersed provides a novel
account for the stylized fact that in parliamentary democracy the diverse preferences of an assembly
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sit alongside fairly centralized decision-making authority.3 A challenging case is where uncertainty
is specific to each policy and expertise is widely dispersed. Does this lead to decentralized decision-
making authority assignments? Surprisingly not. We find that full decentralization is never the
optimal decision-making authority assignment. In fact, all policy decisions should be granted to the
most moderate politician, unless the policy expert has “intermediate” ideology, (i.e., neither she not
too moderate, nor too extreme). Numerical simulations reveal that the optimal decision-making
authority assignment is no less centralized than in the common-state case.
2. Literature Review
Our paper relates to a broad literature on the politics of information aggregation, that builds on
the contributions by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997,
1998) who study situations where, as in our model, players share common interests. Following
the seminal work by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), communication
games are now a canonical framework to study the politics of information aggregation. Most of
this literature has focused on the aggregation of information in committees where a single outcome
is determined by voting. In our model, information is aggregated through communication. While
Coughlin (2001); Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003); Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006)
explore the consequences of allowing committee members to communicate before they vote,4 we
instead consider communication when a set of policy outcomes are allocated to individuals with
decision-making rights that better fits the cabinet setting. Our study of optimal executive structure
from an information aggregation perspective relates to work by Dragu and Board (2013) who show
that the imposition of judicial review can lead to more informed outcomes.
We analyze our game using the multi-player communication model by Galeotti, Ghiglino, and
Squintani (2009) who build on Morgan and Stocken (2008). Its key feature is a coarse information
structure that has the implication that a message sent to a decision-maker is either truthful or
not. This contrasts with information aggregation with a continuous signal space and a single policy
dimension where information can be conveyed only when the message space is partitioned, as in
3In the United Kingdom, for example, decision-making authority has been centralized in a cabinet since the late
19th century, whereas during Parliament’s previous “golden age” the power to initiate policy rested with individual
members (see Cox (1987) for a discussion of the emergence of centralized authority in Victorian England).
4A different, normative, approach consists in devising optimal mechanisms for optimal decisions in committees (see,
e.g.Gerardi, McLean, and Postlewaite (2009) or Gershkov and Szentes (2009))
6
the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Extensions of that paper have shown, however,
that in multiple dimensions the decision-maker can extract all information from an informed agent
Battaglini (2002). Dewan and Hortalla-Valve (2011) extend that framework to provide insights into
a Prime Minister’s control over ministers who are perfectly informed. In our model with coarse
information, by contrast, no player can be perfectly informed and so the quality of final policies
depends on the number of politicians communicating truthfully. Such multi-player communication
is, we believe, the relevant aspect of information aggregation in parliaments and cabinets.
Imposing this structure on the message space provides tractability and substantive new political
insights as witnessed by recent papers by Patty and Penn (2013) on small networks, Dewan and
Squintani (2012) on factions in political parties, and Gailmard and Patty (2009) on delegation and
transparency with sequential decision-making. Our paper significantly extends the multi-player
communication model in considering the possibility that players have specific information about
some decisions but not others. Moreover in studying the question of the optimal assignment of
decision-making rights we derive an entirely new set of theoretical results.
A related paper by Dewan and Squintani (2012) adapts the multi-player communication model to
analyze the formation of party factions. In their model each party politician is endowed with some
say over the party manifesto. They can choose voluntarily to join a faction. Doing so involves
delegating authority to the faction leader who makes the final choice. After factions have formed
the party politicians communicate their information to faction leaders in private. The authors study
a situation where communication can be made only within factions and one where the factional
structure does not prohibit intra-party communication. They analyze the welfare consequences of
factionalism in each case. The key features of that model–private communication and voluntary
delegation of authority–are relevant to party structures. Here, in analyzing the optimal structure of
the executive in a parliamentary democracy our main focus is public communication. The optimal
allocation of authority is that which would be chosen by a welfare maximizing prime minister, and
does not arise through a process of voluntary delegation.
Recent and related work by Patty (2013) complements ours in looking at how the exclusion and
inclusion of cabinet members affects strategic communication. While sharing the same broad mo-
tivation and some modeling choices, the two papers answer distinct questions. Our focus is on
the optimal assignment of executive authority and on the comparison between public and private
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communication. We we show that cabinet meetings are optimal and present novel insights as to
the degree to which power should be centralised in a cabinet and to whom it should be allocated.
Patty (2013), by contrast, considers the optimal size and composition of cabinet meetings with an
exogenous allocation of decision-making authority. He does not make the restriction that cabinet
meetings are limited to those who hold executive authority; indeed in an interesting finding he
shows that it may be optimal for some individuals with executive authority to be excluded while
others without such authority should be included.
The result that cabinet meetings yield higher welfare than private conversations can be related to
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) who compare public communication
and private communication in a much simpler game with a single expert and two decision makers,
but critically do not consider the possibility of reassignment of decision-making authority.
More broadly, our results on the deliberative value of collective meetings provide a new angle
on the study of cabinet governance that typically have focussed on the cabinet as a system of
incentives, managed strategically by a Prime Minister as in citations mentioned earlier. And we
provide an information aggregation justification for centralisation of decision-making rights in an
assembly (either to a single leader or a cabinet with public information) that contributes to a
broad rational choice literature on why majorities adopt restrictive procedures, that looks at the
role of committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987), political parties (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) and
cabinets (Cox, 1987). Recent contributions to this debate include Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) and
Diermeier, Prato, and Vlaicu (2013).
3. Model
We consider the following information aggregation and collective decision problem. Suppose that a
set I = {1, ..., I} of politicians form a Parliamentary majority who provide consent for a governing
executive. They are faced with the collective task of choosing an assignment a : K → I of policy
decisions that grants decision-making authority over a set of policies K = {1, ...,K}. For each k ∈ K,
the decision yˆk is a policy on the left-right spectrum <. For simplicity we think of the assignment
as granting complete jurisdiction over policy k, though of course other interpretations, such as,
for example, the assignment of agenda-setting rights could also be incorporated. The important
element is that decision-making authority over each policy is granted to a unique individual.
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In a fully-decentralized executive each policy decision is assigned to a different politician so that
a (k) 6= a (k′) for all k, k′ in K. At the opposite end of the spectrum, all decisions are centralized to a
single leader so that a (k) = a (k′) for all k, k′ in K. We let the range of a be denoted by a (K) ⊆ I,
which we term as the set of politicians with decision-making authority. We refer to such politicians
as ministers. We let aj denote the number of policies that minister j takes under assignment a. Our
specification thus allows us to capture important elements of the executive body: its size– beyond
the extremes of full decentralization and the leadership of one, there are a range of possibilities;
and its balance–amongst the set of ministers some may have more authority than others.
Politicians are ideologically differentiated, and care about all policy choices made. For any policy
decision yˆk, their preferences also depend on unknown states of the world θk, uniformly distributed
on [0, 1] . Specifically, were she to know the vector of states θ = (θk)k∈K , politician i’s payoff would
be
ui(yˆ, θ) = −
K∑
k=1
(yˆk − θk − bi)2 .
Hence, each politician i’s ideal policy is θk+bi, where the bias bi captures ideological differentiation,
and we assume without loss of generality, that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ ... ≤ bI . The vector of ideologies
b = {b1, ..., bI} is common knowledge.
Each politician i has some private information on the vector θ. Specifically, we make two opposite
assumptions on politicians’ information. Firstly, for some of our analysis we assume that uncertainty
over all policies is captured by a single common state that represents the underlying economic and
social fundamentals. For example, an underlying economic recession will influence policy choices of
all ministries, from the Home office immigration policy, to the fiscal policy of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. We represent these fundamentals by a single uniformly distributed state of the world θ,
so that θk = θ for all k, and each politician i’s signal si is informative about θ. Conditional on θ, si
takes the value equal to one with probability θ and to zero with probability 1−θ. Secondly, and in an
alternative specification we say that the politician’s information is policy specific. Each policy has
its own underlying set of circumstances over which politicians may be informed. Thus the random
variables θk are identical and independently distributed across k ∈ K, and each politician k receives
a signal sk ∈ {0, 1} about θk only, again with Pr(sk = 1|θk) = θk. In the case of policy specific
information, we take K=I so that each politician is informed on a single issue. This specification
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allows us to explore a situation where expertise on policies varies and is widely dispersed amongst
the set of politicians.
In our set-up, politicians can communicate their signals to each other before policies are executed.
We allow for such communication to take the form either of private conversations or general meet-
ings. We might think of the former as taking place over dinner, or via a secure communication
network, with no leakage of information transmitted. Hence, each politician i may send a different
message mˆij ∈ {0, 1} to any politician j. In a meeting, by contrast, a politician is unable to com-
municate privately with a decision-maker as all communication is available to those who exercise
authority. Hence, each politician i sends the same message mˆi to all decision makers. A pure
communication strategy of player i is a function mi(si).
Communication between politicians allows information to be transferred. Up to relabelling of
messages, each communication strategy from i to j may be either truthful, in that a politician
reveals her signal to j, so that mij(si) = si for si ∈ {0, 1}, or “babbling”, and in this case mij(si) does
not depend on si. Hence, the communication strategy profile m defines the truthful communication
network c(m) according to the rule: cij(m) = 1 if and only if mij(si) = si for every si ∈ {0, 1},
which provides us with the communication structure within the set of politicians I = {1, ..., I}.
The second strategic element of our model involves the final policies implemented. Conditional on
her information, and after communication has taken place, each assigned decision-maker implements
her preferred policy. We denote a policy strategy by i as yi,k : {0, 1}I → < for all policies k such
that i = a(k). Given the received messages mˆ−i,i, by sequential rationality, politician i chooses yˆi,k
to maximize expected utility, for all k such that i = a(k). So,
(1) yi,k(si, mˆi,−i) = bi + E[θk|si, mˆ−i,i],
and this is due to the quadratic loss specification of players payoffs.
Given an assignment a, an equilibrium then consists of the strategy pair (m,y) and a set of beliefs
that are consistent with equilibrium play. We use the further restriction that an equilibrium must
be consistent with some beliefs held by politicians off the equilibrium path of play. Thus our
equilibrium concept is pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Fixing policy assignment a,
then, regardless of the communication mode adopted, there may be multiple equilibria (m,y). For
example, the strategy profile where all players “babble” is always an equilibrium. Equilibrium
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multiplicity makes the ranking of decision-making authority assignments a not well defined: Given
the same assignment a, different equilibria may yield different payoffs to the politicians, so that
the politicians’ initial collective decision over assignments a is impossible. To avoid this issue, we
assume that, for any assignment a, politicians coordinate on the equilibria (m,y) that give them
the highest payoffs.5 This equilibrium selection is standard in games of communication.
We focus on the optimal assignment of authority, defined as the assignments a that induce the
equilibria (m,y) with the largest joint payoffs:
W (m,y; a) = −
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
E[(ya(k),k − θk − bi)2].
Our notion of welfare is ex-ante Utilitarian: assume that the collective decision on the optimal
assignment a, by politicians in I maximizes the sum of their expected payoffs. But for some of our
results, we can invoke the weaker principle of Pareto optimality.
We first provide a useful derivation for our main results. We first say that a politician j’s moderation
is
∣∣bj −∑i∈I bi/I∣∣ , the distance between bj and the average ideology ∑i∈I bi/I. We note that
politicians’ moderation does not depend on the assignment a, nor on the equilibrium (m,y) .
Second, we let dj,k(m) denote politician j’s information on the state θk given the equilibrium
(m,y). Specifically, dj,k(m) consists in the number of signals on θk held by j, including her own,
after communication has taken place and before she makes her choice.
With common value information, each politician’s information coincides with the number of politi-
cians communicating truthfully with her, plus her own signal. Later on in our analysis we will
adopt a specification with policy specific knowledge, each politician j may hold at most one signal
on each θk, either because sk is her own signal (j = k), or because sk was communicated by k to j
given the equilibrium communication structure c(m).
Armed with these definitions, and given an assignment a and an equilibrium (m,y), we show in
the Appendix that the equilibrium ex-ante welfare W (m,y; a) can be rewritten as:
(2) W (m,y; a) = −
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(bi − ba(k))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate ideological loss
−
∑
k∈K
I
6[da(k),k(m) + 2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate residual variance
.
5Indeed, it can be easily shown that for any given assignment a each politicians’ ranking among the possible equilibria
(m,y) is the same (see Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2009), Theorem 2.)
11
This decomposes the welfare function into two elements– aggregate ideological loss and the aggre-
gate residual variance of the politicians’ decisions– and proves useful in the results that follow.6
4. Private Conversations in Common State Model
We begin our study of the optimal assignment of decision making in an environment where un-
derlying fundamentals are common to all policies so that politicians’ information is relevant to all
decisions. Initially we explore the situation where politicians communicate only in private with
decision-makers. We first describe the equilibrium communication structure given any policy as-
signment a. The characterization extends Corollary 1 of Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2009)
to the case of arbitrary policy assignments. For future reference, for any assignment a, we write
d∗j (a) as the information dj(m) associated with any welfare-maximizing equilibrium (m,y) .
7 When
the state θ is common across policies, and the communication is private, we prove in the Appendix
that the profile m is an equilibrium if and only if, whenever i is truthful to j,
(3) |bi − bj | ≤ 1
2 [dj(m) + 2]
.
The fact that truthful communication can arise in our model is a consequence of the binary signal
structure. When the direction of policy under truthful revelation is opposite to the bias of the
politician relative to the minister (for example a politician with bi > bj and si = 0) he is concerned
that by misrepresenting his signal the final policy will overshoot his preferred one. An important
consequence of equilibrium condition 3 is that truthful communication from politician i to minister
j is independent of the specific policy decisions assigned to j and of the possibility of communicating
with any other politician j′. Furthermore, truthful communication from politician i to minister j
becomes less likely with an increase in the difference between their ideological positions.8
6Note that, statistically, the residual variance may be interpreted as the inverse of the precision of the politicians’
decisions.
7Because there is a single politicy-relevant state θ, we drop the subscript k from the notation dj,k(m), the number
of informative signals held by politician j on state θk in equilibrium.
8 A perhaps more surprising effect is that the possibility for i to communicate truthfully with j decreases with the
information held by j in equilibrium. To see why communication from i to j is less likely to be truthful when j is
well informed in equilibrium, suppose that bi > bj , so that i’s ideology is to the right of j’s bliss point. Suppose j
is well informed and that politician i deviates from the truthful communication strategy –she reports mˆij = 1 when
si = 0–then she will induce a small shift of j’s action to the right. Such a small shift in j’s action is always beneficial
in expectation to i, as it brings j’s action closer to i’s (expected) bliss point. Hence, politician i will not be able to
truthfully communicate the signal si = 0. By contrast, when j has a small number of players communicating with
her, then i’s report mˆij = 1 moves j’s action to the right significantly, possibly beyond i’s bliss point. In this case,
biasing rightwards j’s action may result in a loss for politician i and so she would prefer to report truthfully- that is,
she will not deviate from the truthful communication strategy.
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Having characterized equilibrium communication between politicians and ministers we explore the
implication of expression 3 with respect to the assignment of executive authority.
Proposition 1. Suppose that θ is common across policies, and that communication is private.
For generic ideologies b, any Pareto optimal assignment involves decision-making authority being
centralized to a single leader j: that is a(k) = j for all k.
The finding that all decisions should be assigned to a single leader and, hence, executive authority
should be fully centralized, follows from two different facts. First, truthful communication from
politician i to minister j in equilibrium is independent of the specific policy decisions assigned to j,
(or to any other politician j′). Second, the stipulation that every politicians’ information is relevant
for all policies implies that politicians and policies are “interchangeable.” As a consequence of these
two facts, whoever is the optimal politician to make one policy decision will also be the optimal
politician to make all of them. This result holds with our utilitarian welfare criterion and under
the weak welfare concept of Pareto optimality. In sum, with the restriction to private conversation
between a politician and a minister, the optimal size of the executive is one: leadership by a
dominant Prime Minister emerges.
5. Cabinet Meetings vs. Private Conversations in the Common State Model
Having considered communication via private meetings, we now study optimal assignment of deci-
sion making authority when there is a cabinet providing a forum for information to be conveyed to
the set of ministers. This change to the communication environment affects the strategic calculus
of information transmission: it is possible that politician i would not wish to communicate with
minister j on a policy if that information is shared with minister j′; conversely, politician i might
share information with j because minister j′ also has access to that information.
The next result characterizes communication equilibria under any policy assignment. It extends
Theorem 1 of Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2009) to the case of arbitrary policy assignments.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the state θ is common across policies k, and communication takes place
in cabinet meetings. The strategy profile m is an equilibrium if and only if, whenever i is truthful,
(4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣bi −
∑
j 6=i
bjγj(m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j 6=i
γj(m)
2[dj(m) + 2]
,
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where for every j 6= i,
γj(m) ≡ aj/[dj(m) + 2]∑
j′ 6=i aj′/[dj′(m) + 2]
.
Intuitively, each politician i’s willingness to communicate truthfully depends on a weighted aver-
age of all the ministers’ ideologies. The specific weights are inversely related to the equilibrium
information of each politician. Analyzing them reveals that, in contrast to the earlier case, truthful
communication from politician i to minister j in equilibrium depends upon the policy assignment.
Thus the characterization of the communication structure given by Lemma 1 implies that our ear-
lier result in proposition 1– namely that private conversation leads to fully centralized authority
– can be reversed once we allow for public meetings. So formal power-sharing agreements in a
multi-member executive that meets in cabinet may be optimal. We illustrate this possibility with
a simple example with 4 politicians and a generic set of biases.
Example 1. Suppose that I = K = 4. Biases are b1 = −β, b2 = ε, b3 = β, and b4 = 2β, where ε is
a positive quantity smaller than β.9 We compare four assignments, full decentralization, leadership
by politician 2 (the most moderate politician), and two forms of power sharing agreements between
politicians 2 and 3: in the symmetric power-sharing agreement, politicians 2 and 3 make two
decisions each; in the asymmetric power-sharing agreement, politician 2 makes 3 choices, and 3
makes one choice.
The analysis requires calculating the welfare maximizing equilibria for each of the four assignments
and comparing welfare across them. Details are relegated to the Appendix. Here, we note that
taking the limit for vanishing ε > 0 the following observations obtain. First, for β < 1/24, all
players are fully informed under any of the four considered assignments; at the same time, for
β > 1/18, there is no truthful communication regardless of the assignment; in both cases the
optimal assignment entails selecting the most moderate politician 2 as the unique leader. Second,
for β ∈ (1/24, 1/21), politician 1 and 4 are willing to communicate truthfully under any power
sharing agreement, but politician 4 is not willing to share information if politician 2 is the single
leader. Third, for β ∈ (1/21, 1/18), players 1 and 4 are both willing to talk publicly only when the
symmetric power sharing agreement is in place. Finally, for β ∈ (1/24, 1/18), there is no advantage
from assigning any choice to player 3 instead of player 2. Our result is summarized as follows.
9When  = 0 there is a multiplicity of optimal allocations, which is not generic.
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Result 1. Suppose that I = K = 4, with b1 = −β, b2 = ε, b3 = β, and b4 = 2β, and compare
leadership by 2, full decentralization, and power sharing agreements between 2 and 3, under public
communication of information with common state. As  goes to zero the following holds: For
β < 1/24 or β > 1/18, it is optimal to select 2 as the leader; For β ∈ (1/24, 1/21), the optimal
assignment is the symmetric power sharing agreement of 2 and 3; For β ∈ (1/21, 1/18), the optimal
assignment is the asymmetric power sharing agreement where 2 makes 3 choices, and 3 makes one
choice.
The fact that full authority centralization is always optimal when conversations are private though
not necessarily when there are public meetings, together with the observation that private and
public communication equilibria coincide when all authority is granted to a single leader, provides
a striking result: the possibility of cabinet meetings induces a Pareto improvement.
This result, one of the main findings of our paper, holds independently of whether or not private
conversations take place alongside cabinet deliberations, in our model. The above argument is,
evidently, conclusive when private conversations are ruled out. To assess the opposite case, note
that private conversation may always involve babbling in equilibrium. Then, because we always
select the Pareto optimal equilibrium of any communication game, it immediately follows that the
argument developed above holds also when cabinet discussion may be supplemented with a private
exchange of views between politicy-makers. We state our finding formally:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the state θ is common across policies k. For generic ideologies b, the
optimal assignment of decision-making authority when information is exchanged in cabinet meetings
Pareto dominates any authority assignment when information is exchanged only privately.
Proposition 2 bears important consequences for optimal executive structure. It shows that if politi-
cians in I can assign authority optimally, then imposing a cabinet structure to the executive– a
public meeting at a designated time and place where ministers provide the information relevant to
their decisions– induces a Pareto improvement over other forms of executive governance. In par-
ticular, Cabinet government Pareto dominates an executive where individual ministers implement
policy but are not bound to share policy relevant information.
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6. Optimal Cabinet Design in Common State Model
We have seen that when conversations with ministers take place in private then the optimal exec-
utive is centralised with a single decision-maker. A multi-member executive that meets in cabinet
can, however, outperform a single-member executive. This provides a normative justification for
cabinet governance. What is the optimal assignment of authority within a cabinet? An analysis of
result 1 suggests that it is non-monotonic in the level of disagreement between politicians and that
centralisation is optimal in the two polar cases, those with very high or very low agreement. The
next result formalizes this intuition for our general setting.
Proposition 3. Let i∗ be the most moderate politician, i.e., i∗ = arg minj∈I
∣∣bj −∑i∈I bi/I∣∣
1. There exists ∆ > 0 such that if maxj∈I |bj−bi∗ | ≤ ∆ then the optimal allocation of authority
is centralised to politician i∗.
2. For every profile of ideologies {b1, ..., bI} there exists δ < ∞ such that, under profile of
ideologies {βb1, ..., βbI} and for all β ≥ δ, the optimal allocation of authority is centralised
to politician i∗.
When politicians have similar ideological preferences then there are few strategic constraints on
communication in the parliament. In particular, even a relatively extreme politician can commu-
nicate with the most moderate one. Since information can then be aggregated regardless of the
specific allocation of authority, it is better that power is centralised to a single moderate politician.
When disparity in the ideological views of the politicians is large then communication with minis-
ters is not possible and so from a welfare perspective it is desirable that the decision-maker respects
the diversity of viewpoints. Again, the most moderate politician is best placed to do so and so
power should be centralised. The fact that a multi-member cabinet can sometimes be optimal, as
a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and Example 1, completes the proof of the claim.
Combining propositions 2 and 3 provides an answer to the question posed in our introduction: in the
absence or ambiguity of constitutional guidelines, to what extent should power be centralised? Our
results reveal that when information aggregation is not an important consideration–even relative
extremists can communicate to the center, or politicians do not communicate at all–then full
centralisation is desirable. But when information aggregation is more sensitive to the allocation of
authority then it is better that power is shared in a multi-member cabinet.
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Beyond this insight, what does the optimal allocation of authority within a cabinet look like? There
are subtle considerations that make it difficult to provide a precise answer. Though note that in
the example described in Result 1 the optimal allocation is single peaked around the moderate
politician. One might conjecture then that this is a general property of the optimal authority
allocation in cabinets.10 This conjecture, as our next example shows, is incorrect.
Example 2. Suppose I = |K| = 7 and assume that bi+1 − bi = 0.116 for all i ∈ I. In this case
one can easily show that the optimal allocation of authority a∗i is a
∗
3 = 1, a
∗
4 = 5, a
∗
6 = 1. That
is one policy is allocated to politician 3, five are allocated to politician 4, and the remaining one
is allocated to politician 6. Optimal equilibrium communication involves only politicians 4 and 5
communicating truthfully; all other politicians babble.
Here the optimal allocation of authority is not single peaked: whereas the most moderate politician
4 has the largest share of authority her immediate neighbour 5 has none, while politician 6 has
some. To provide intuition for this surprising result, consider an alternative single-peaked allocation
a3 = 1, a4 = 5, a5 = 1. This closely resembles a
∗ except that the policy allocated to politician
6 under a∗ is now given to politician 5. This transfer of authority makes the allocation more
concentrated toward the moderate politician 4 and so better reflects the diversity of politicians’
views. However, under this single peaked allocation less information is aggregated.
To understand why, focus on the incentive for politician 5 to communicate truthfully. Under the
alternative and suboptimal allocation a∗, politician 5 has an incentive to misreport a low signal
to other cabinet members as doing so would bias their decisions toward her ideal point. Under
the optimal allocation, by contrast, her incentive to misreport a low signal to 3 and 4 is offset by
its effect on politician 6 who is now included in the cabinet. Misreporting a low signal could bias
politician 6’s action far away from 5’s bliss point. So we see that whereas 5 communicates truthfully
in the optimal allocation she does not do so in the single peaked allocation.
An intriguing implication of our finding is that the set of ministers included in the cabinet is
not ideologically connected. The prediction that they will be connected arises in classic models
of coalition formation Axelrod (1970), though this result can be overturned in non-cooperative
bargaining models Austen-Smith and Banks (1990). From our information aggregation creating
10To further explore optimal decision-making authority assignments in cabinet governments we have also run simula-
tions for a 7 member parliament. The results show that in most cases centralization of authority in a multi-member
cabinet is Pareto superior to other executive forms. The details and the results of this exercise are reported in an
online appendix.
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“holes” in the cabinet– so that moderate politicians are bye-passed for more extreme ones– provides
better incentives for communication and disciplines politicians who otherwise would misrepresent
their views.
Till now we have considered a small group of politicians. Since parliament is a large representative
body, and those on the government payroll can be represent a significant fraction (in the UK, of
around 650 MPs roughly 20% play some role in government) it is interesting to observe the optimal
allocation of authority in the limit case as the number of politicians becomes large. Doing so we
provide a strong characterization result: all decision making authority should be concentrated to
politicians who are ideologically close to the most moderate one.
Proposition 4. Suppose that biases bi, i = 1, ..., I are i.i.d. and drawn from a distribution with
connected support with mean b¯. For every small δ > 0, there exists a possibly large Iδ > 0 so that
for all I > Iδ, with at least 1 − δ probability, the fraction of decisions in the optimal assignment
concentrated to politicians with biases b such that |b− b¯| < δ is larger than 1− δ.
The proof of Proposition 4 consists of two parts. First, we show that when all decisions are allocated
to a single politician i and parliament grows large the decision-maker becomes fully informed.
Second, we compare the case where all decisions are allocated to the most moderate politician to
that where some decisions are allocated to a less moderate one. As the parliament becomes large
the aggregate residual variance obtained in each of these assignments vanishes. The difference in
the aggregate ideological loss of these assignments is, however, bounded below.
It is important to stress that Proposition 4 does not imply that welfare is equivalent in large
parliaments that adopt cabinet meetings and ones where communication with decision-makers is
private. In fact, our normative justification for cabinet governance holds for any size majority,
including large ones.
7. Policy Specific Information
This section studies optimal assignment of decision making authority when each politician’s infor-
mation is policy specific, so that only politician k receives a signal about θk, for each policy k. We
begin by characterizing equilibrium communication.
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Lemma 2. Suppose that information is policy specific. The profile (m,y) is an equilibrium if and
only if, whenever politician k is truthful to a(k) 6= k,
|bk − ba(k)| ≤ 1/6.
Since each politician has only one signal and that signal is informative of only one policy decision,
the amount of information held by politician a(k) 6= k depends only on whether k is truthful or
not. Hence, whether k is truthful (or not) does not depend on the communication strategy of any
other politician. Further, because each politician is informed on one policy only, and this policy
may be assigned to a single policy maker, there is no difference between private conversations and
cabinet meetings.
This characterization of information transmission bears the following implication. The possibility
that a politician k truthfully communicates her signal to the minister a(k) to whom decision k is
assigned is independent of any other assignment. Hence, for all choices k, the optimal assignment
a (k) can be selected independently of other assignments. The optimal assignment is to allocate
decision k to the politician j who maximizes:
−
I∑
i=1
(bj − bi)2
I
− 1
6(dj,k(m) + 2)
,
where dj,k(m) = 1 if |bk − bj | ≤ 1/6 and dj,k(m) = 0, otherwise.
Simplifying the above expression, and using Lemma 2, we see that the optimal selection of a (k)
takes a simple form when information is policy specific: policy decision k should be assigned to
either the most moderate politician m∗ = arg minm
∣∣∣bm −∑Ii=1 bi/I∣∣∣ , or to the most moderate
politician m (k) informed of k, i.e., to m (k) = arg minm:|bm−bk|≤1/6
∣∣∣bm −∑Ii=1 bi/I∣∣∣ , depending on
whether
(5)
I∑
i=1
(
bi − bm(k)
)2
I
−
I∑
i=1
(bi − bm∗)2
I
> (<)
1
36
.
Because for any j, the quantity
∑I
i=1 (bi − bj)2 /I is the average ideological loss, whereas the infor-
mation gain is 1/36, we may summarize our analysis as follows.
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Lemma 3. When information is policy specific, each decision k is optimally assigned to either the
most moderate informed politician m (k) or to the most moderate one m∗, depending on whether
the difference in average ideological loss is smaller or greater than the informational gain.
With the above characterization we now show that although policy specific information might lead
one to believe that full decentralization is optimal, this is, in fact, never the case.
Proposition 5. Despite policy specific information, full decentralization is never optimal for
generic ideologies b. The most moderate politician m∗ is assigned the policies of sufficiently
moderate and of sufficiently extreme-bias expert politicians, but not necessarily the policies of
intermediate-bias politicians.
The complete proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix, here we convey the main intu-
ition behind the result. Because moderate policy experts are willing to inform the most moderate
politician m∗, it is optimal that she is given authority on these policies. Since extreme policy ex-
perts are willing to communicate only with extreme politicians, it is better to let the (uninformed)
most moderate politician decide. Only for intermediate case policies k, it is not optimal that the
most moderate politician decides, and that the decision is given to m(k).
Our result relates to Dessein (2002) who shows, in a different environment, that it is optimal for a
decision-maker to delegate authority to an expert with a small bias and a signal from a continuum.
We show that decentralization is not optimal with policy specific information; instead it is better
that the most moderate politician is assigned the decisions of moderate experts. The difference
arises because our model has binary signals instead of continuous ones. Nevertheless our result
that full decentralization is never optimal still hold if signals are continuous: then, the decision of
extreme experts should be optimally assigned to the most moderate politician.
8. Conclusion
We have analyzed the optimal structure of the executive, restricting to the set of institutions that
allow for assignment of decision-making authority to individuals with collective deliberation over
outcomes; two of the core features of cabinet governance found in parliamentary democracies. Our
main results focus on the case where uncertainty over policy outcomes is generated by a shock that
affects all policies. Then we show that cabinet meetings, that provide a mechanism for information
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made available to one minister to be available to all decision-makers, can improve the quality of
policies implemented: they allow for more policy relevant information to be aggregated than would
be the case in their absence. We then analyzed the optimal degree of centralisation of executive
power and showed that it is non-monotonic in the ideological divergence in the majority party: For
intermediate levels of divergence it is optimal for power to be shared between cabinet ministers;
otherwise it is optimal for power to be concentrated to the most moderate politician. Surprisingly,
when power is shared in a cabinet of ministers then in the optimal allocation the set of ministers
with decision-making authority need not be ideologically connected. In large cabinets, however,
authority should be concentrated to the most moderate politicians. Overall our results highlight the
desirability of a centralised governing executive that holds cabinet meetings. We ask whether this
depends upon the dispersion of policy relevant expertise. Surprisingly, in the case where shocks
are policy specific and a single politician is imperfectly informed about its effects the degree of
centralisation is no less centralised.
The two informational environments we have considered – perfect correlation and independence–
are the classic ones most studied in game theoretical applications, for example with respect to
auctions. We thus take them as the natural starting point for our investigation into optimal
executive structure. An obvious question is whether our core insights are robust to the imposition
of a mixed case. Our preliminary investigations reveal that this is in fact the case: the results
developed here are not confined to the two cases we study and the trade-offs we have highlighted
are indeed relevant to the mixed case also.11
Finally, we highlight several areas of further research. Our work establishes a normative benchmark
for evaluating the assignment of decision-making authority to heads of executive departments in
parliamentary democracies. In practice the assignment of decision-making rights is carried out by
a prime minister who is answerable to the parliamentary majority. As noted by Strøm (2000), this
creates a “singular chain” of delegation, from the parliamentary majority to a prime minister and
11Due to space limitations we omit the analysis but provide a brief summary here. The full analysis is available
upon request. To investigate the case of correlation among policies, we considered the simple environment where,
before making a choice, each politician knows that with probability p all policies are perfectly correlated and with
the remaining probability they are perfectly independent. The model degenerates to the two environments we have
considered for p ∈ {0, 1}. Characterising the incentive compatibility conditions for truthful communication for
arbitrary allocations and modes of communication reveals that, perhaps unsurprisingly, it is continuous in p. This,
in turn, implies that our results derived under the assumption of perfect correlation and of independence hold for p
sufficiently high and p sufficiently low, respectively. Moreover, the analysis reveals that optimal allocation in the case
of intermediate correlation involves a trade off between politicians’ moderation and the information that they hold
in equilibrium that is the driving force behind our results.
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the heads of departments, that distinguishes parliamentary democracies from presidential ones.12
Thus our analysis reveals the delegation patterns of a Prime Minister who maximizes the welfare
of a parliamentary majority. Since the class of parliamentary democracies is large there are, of
course, several variations from this ideal type that could be considered. For example, in some
parliamentary democracies the assignment is to a senior executive head shadowed by a junior
minister within the same department.13 In other parliamentary democracies, such as Israel, the
cabinet votes over policy rather than delegating the decision to a single minister. And of course
the assignment of authority might be part of a prime minister’s strategic plan and so her objectives
may conflict with those of members of her government and the majority in parliament. A further
extension might consider how centralized authority affects the interaction between party elites and
voters whose actions jointly determine the ideological composition of the assembly; and how the
degree of centralization of decision-making authority responds to party control over nomination of
the members of Parliament. All of these substantive applications could be approached within the
current modeling framework though we have not done so here.
Further lines of enquiry can be addressed within our framework, but would involve more exten-
sive modifications of the model. Here we have assumed that the parliamentary majority assigns
“decision-making authority” to ministers, having in mind the fusion of legislative and executive
powers found in many parliamentary democracies. Our model could be modified so that the parlia-
mentary majority nominates agenda setters whose proposal needs then to be formally approved by
the Parliament. More generally, the parliamentary majority could assign authority to committees
rather than to individuals. As these lines of enquiry require significant changes to the model, we
defer them to future research.
9. Appendix
Equilibrium beliefs. In our model a politicians’ equilibrium updating is based on the standard
Beta-binomial model. Suppose that a politician i holds n bits of information, i.e. she holds the
private signal si and n − 1 politicians truthfully reveal their signal to her. The probability that l
12Though as argued by Patty (2013), the distinction is perhaps not so clear.
13In Thies (2001) such arrangements allow ministers with different preferences to enforce the implementation of a
compromise policy. Here, and as in the models of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Laver and Shepsle (1996) the
minister in charge of an issue always implements his preferred policy.
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out of such n signals equal one, conditional on θ is
f (l|θ, n) = n!
l! (n− l)!θ
l (1− θ)(n−l) .
Hence, politician i’s posterior is
f (θ|l, n) = (n+ 1)!
l! (n− l)!θ
l (1− θ)(n−l) ,
the expected value is
E (θ|l, n) = l + 1
n+ 2
,
and the variance is
V (θ|l, n) = (l + 1) (n− l + 1)
(n+ 2)2 (n+ 3)
.
Derivation of equilibrium welfare, expression 2. Assume (m,y) is an equilibrium. The
ex-ante expected utility of each player i is:
Eui(m,y) = −E
[
K∑
k=1
(yˆk − θ − bi)2; (m,y)
]
= −
K∑
k=1
E
[
(ya(k),k − θ − bi)2; (m,y)
]
= −
K∑
k=1
E
[
(ba(k) + E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ − bi)2; m]
where Ωa(k) denotes the equilibrium information of player a (k) , and we have dropped the reference
to y in the last equality, as, after substituting ya(k) with ba(k) +E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]
, the reported expression
no longer depends on y. Hence
Eui(m,y) = −
K∑
k=1
E
[
(ba(k) − bi)2 +
(
E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ)2 − 2(ba(k) − bi) (E [θ|Ωa(k)]− θ) ; m]
= −
K∑
k=1
[
(ba(k) − bi)2 + E
[(
E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ)2 ; m]
−2(ba(k) − bi)
(
E[E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]
; m]− E[θ; m])] ,
by the law of iterated expectations, E[E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]
; m] = E[θ; m], and by definition
E
[(
E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ)2 ; m] = σ2k(m).
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Further, note that the equilibrium information Ωa(k) of player a (k) may be represented as any
vector in {0, 1}dj(c). Letting l be the number of digits equal to one in any such vector, we obtain
E
[(
E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ)2 ; m] = ∫ 1
0
da(k)(c)∑
l=0
(
E
[
θ|l, da(k)(c)
]− θ)2 f(l|da(k)(c), θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
da(k)(c)∑
l=0
(
E
[
θ|l, da(k)(c)
]− θ)2 f (θ|l, da(k)(c))
da(k)(c) + 1
dθ,
where the second equality follows from f(l|da(k)(c), θ) = f(θ|l, da(k)(c))/(da(k)(c) + 1).
Because the variance of a beta distribution of parameters l and d, is
V (θ|l, d) = (l + 1) (d− l + 1)
(d+ 2)2 (d+ 3)
,
we obtain:
E
[(
E
[
θ|Ωa(k)
]− θ)2 ; m] = 1
da(k)(c) + 1
da(k)(c)∑
l=0
V
(
θ|l, da(k)(c)
)
=
da(k)(c)∑
l=0
(l + 1)
(
da(k)(c)− l + 1
)
(da(k)(c) + 1)
(
da(k)(c) + 2
)2 (
da(k)(c) + 3
)
=
1
6(da(k)(c) + 2)
.

Proof of Proposition 1. Fix any assignment a. Any Pareto optimal equilibrium (m,y) maximizes
the welfare
W (m,y; γ; a) = −
∑
i∈I
γi
∑
k∈K
E[(yˆk − θk − bi)2|si,mN¯i,i],
for some Pareto weights γ. Following the same steps in the derivation of expression 2 we obtain
that
W (m,y; γ; a) = −
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
γi(bi − ba(k))2 −
∑
k∈K
1
6[da(k),k(m) + 2]
.
This decomposition, together with equilibrium condition 3, imply that, as long as j is active under
a the equilibrium information d∗j (a) associated to any Pareto optimal equilibrium (m,y) is inde-
pendent of the set of policy choices a−1 (i) assigned to any player i, including j. Hence, choosing
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the Pareto-optimal assignment is equivalent to finding the index j that maximizes
(6) −
I∑
i=1
γi (bj − bi)2 − 1
6(dj(m) + 2)
,
and to assigning all policy choices k to such optimal j. For generic vectors of biases b, the expression
(6) has a unique maximizer. 
Proof of Lemma 1 and Derivation of Expression 3. We first prove Lemma 1 and then
derive Expression 3 as a corollary. Consider any j ∈ a(K), and suppose let Cj(c) be the set of
players truthfully communicating with j in equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium network neighbors of
j. The equilibrium information of j is thus dj = |Cj(c)|+ 1, the cardinality of Cj(c) plus j’s signal.
Consider any player i ∈ Cj(c). Let sR be the vector containing sj and the (truthful) messages of
all players in Cj(c) except i. Let also y
j
sR,s be the action that j would take if he has information
sR and player i has sent signal s; analogously, y
j
sR,1−s is the action that j would take if he has
information sR and player i has sent signal 1− s. Agent i reports truthfully signal s to a collection
of agents J if and only if
−
∑
j∈J
∑
k:a(k)=j
∫ 1
0
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
[(
yjsR,s − θ − bi
)2 − (yjsR,1−s − θ − bi)2] f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Using the identity a2 − b2 = (a− b)(a+ b) and simplifying, we obtain:
−
∑
j∈J
∫ 1
0
aj
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
[(
yjsR,s − yjsR,1−s
)
(
yjsR,s + y
j
sR,1−s
2
− (θ + bi))
]
f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Next, observing that
yjsR,s = bj + E [θ|sR, s] ,
we obtain
−
∑
j∈J
∫ 1
0
aj
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
[(E[θ + bj |sR, s]− E[θ + bj |sR, 1− s])
·
(
E[θ + bj |sR, s] + E[θ + bj |sR, 1− s]
2
− (θ + bi)
)]
f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Denote
∆ (sR, s) = E [θ|sR, s]− E [θ|sR, 1− s] .
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Observing that:
f(θ, sR|s) = f(θ|sR, s)P (sR|s),
and simplifying, we get:
−
∑
j∈J
aj
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
∫ 1
0
[
∆ (sR, s)
(
E [θ|sR, s] + E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi − θ
)]
·
·f(θ|sR, s)P (sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Furthermore, ∫ 1
0
θf(θ|sR, s)dθ = E[θ|sR, s],
and ∫ 1
0
P (θ|sR, s)E[θ|sR, s]dθ = E[θ|sR, s],
because E[θ|sR, s] does not depend on θ. Therefore, we obtain:
−
∑
j∈J
aj
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
[
∆ (sR, s)
(
E [θ|sR, s] + E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi − E [θ|sR, s]
)]
P (sR|s)
= −
∑
j∈J
aj
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj−1
[
∆ (sR, s)
(
−E [θ|sR, s]− E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi
)]
P (sR|s) ≥ 0.
Now, note that:
∆ (sR, s) = E[θ|sR, s]− E[θ|sR, 1− s]
= E [θ|l + s, dj + 1]− E [θ|l + 1− s, dj + 1]
= (l + 1 + s) / (dj + 2)− (l + 2− s) / (dj + 2)
=
 −1/ (dj + 2) if s = 01/ (dj + 2) if s = 1.
where l is the number of digits equal to one in sR. Hence, we obtain that agent i is willing to
communicate to agent j the signal s = 0 if and only if:
−
∑
j∈J
aj
( −1
dj + 2
)(
− −1
2(dj + 2)
+ bj − bi
)
≥ 0,
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or ∑
j∈J
aj
bj − bi
dj + 2
≥ −
∑
j∈J
aj
1
2 (dj + 2)
2
Note that this condition is redundant if
∑
j∈J aj (bj − bi) > 0. On the other hand, she is willing to
communicate to agent j the signal s = 1 if and only if:
−
∑
j∈J
aj
(
1
dj + 2
)(
− 1
2(dj + 2)
+ bj − bi
)
≥ 0,
or ∑
j∈J
aj
bj − bi
dj + 3
≤
∑
j∈J
aj
1
2 (dj + 3)
2 .
Note that this condition is redundant if
∑
j∈J aj (bj − bi) < 0. Collecting the two conditions yields:
(7)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈J
aj
bj − bi
dj + 3
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j∈J
aj
2 (dj + 3)
2 .
Rearranging condition 7 completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Result 1. Consider a cabinet of 4 politicians, with biases b1 = −β, b2 = ε, b3 = β, and
b4 = 2β. We suppose that ε > 0 is small, so that politician 2 is the most moderate. We compare four
assignments, full decentralization, leadership by politician 2, a symmetric power-sharing agreement
where politicians 2 and 3 make two decisions each, and an asymmetric power-sharing agreement
where politician 2 makes 3 choices, and 3 makes one choice.
Consider leadership by politician 2, first. We calculate d2 = 4 if 2β−ε ≤ 1/12, i.e., β ≤ ε/2+1/24,
whereas d2 = 3 if β+ ε ≤ 1/10, i.e. β ≤ 1/10− ε, as well as d2 = 2 if β− ε ≤ 1/8, i.e., β ≤ 1/8 + ε,
and d2 = 1 if β > 1/8 + ε.
Consider the symmetric power sharing rule. First note that, if 1 is willing to talk, then so are all
other players. Hence, for 2 (β + ε) + 2 · 2β ≤ 42(3+3) , i.e., β ≤ 1/18 − ε/3, then both d2 = 4 and
d3 = 4. Further, for 2 (2β − ε) + 2β ≤ 42(2+3) , i.e., β ≤ 1/15 + ε/3, then 1 does not talk, but 4 does,
and so, d2 = 3 and d3 = 3. Finally, for β − ε ≤ 1/8, i.e., β ≤ 1/8 + ε, then both 2 and 3 talk to
each other: d2 = 2 and d3 = 2. Of course, d2 = 1 and d3 = 1, if β > 1/8 + ε.
Hence, the symmetric power sharing rule dominates the single leader 2 on (ε/2+1/24, 1/18−ε/3] in
terms of information transmission. It will dominate on a subset, because of the moderation effect,
but as ε→ 0, the subset converges to (1/24, 1/18).
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Consider now the asymmetric power sharing rule. In this case the condition for 1 to talk (if 4
is talking) becomes: 34 (β + ε) +
1
42β ≤ 12(3+3) , i.e., β ≤ 1/15 − 3ε/5. The condition for 4 to
talk if 1 is talking becomes, 34 (2β − ε) + 14β ≤ 12(3+3) , i.e., β ≤ 1/21 + 3ε/7. Hence, for β ≤
1/21 + 3ε/7, then both d2 = 4 and d3 = 4. Instead, the condition for 1 to talk if 4 does not talk is
3
4 (β + ε) +
1
42β ≤ 12(2+3) , i.e., β ≤ 2/25 − 3ε/5. And the condition for 4 to talk if 1 does not talk
is 34 (2β − ε) + 14β ≤ 12(2+3) , i.e. β ≤ 37ε + 235 . Hence, for β ≤ 2/25 − 3ε/5, then both d2 = 3 and
d3 = 3. The condition for 2 and 3 to each other talk is β ≤ 1/8 + ε; in this case d2 = 2 and d3 = 2.
Again, d2 = 1 and d3 = 1, if β > 1/8 + ε.
Hence, the asymmetric power sharing agreement dominates the single leader 2 informationally on
(ε/2 + 1/24, 1/21 − 3ε/7]. Due to the moderation effect, it also dominates the symmetric power
sharing agreement. For ε→ 0, asymmetric power sharing agreement dominates on (1/24, 1/21).
Finally, consider full decentralization. The player who is least likely to speak publicly is 1. Given
that all other players speak, he speaks if and only if (β + ε) + 2β + 3β ≤ 32[3+3]or β ≤ 124 − ε/6.
In this case, all players receive 3 signals, 124 = 0.04166 7. Then, if 1 does not speak, the least likely
to speak is 4. This occurs if and only if 3β3+3 +
2β−ε+β
2+3 ≤ 12(3+3)2 +
2
2(2+3)2
, i.e. if β ≤ 211ε + 971980
for ε → 0, this is close to 971980 ≈ 0.04899. When 1 does not speak publicly, whereas 4 does, the
d-distribution is: 3, 2, 2, 2; which is informationally better than the private communication to 2.
But, of course, it is worse in terms of moderation... Further, decentralization is dominated by the
symmetric power sharing agreements, for the range β ≤ 1/18 − ε/3, as 1/18 ≈ 0.055556; because
in this range d2 = 3 and d3 = 3 for the asymmetric power sharing agreements. Then, if 1 and 4
do not speak, the least likely to speak is 3 —because 2 is more central. This occurs if and only if
2β
2+3 +
β−ε
1+3 +
β
2+3 ≤ 12(1+3)2 +
2
2(2+3)2
, i.e., β ≤ 517ε+ 57680 ≈ 0.083824, with the distribution 2, 1, 1, 2.
This is dominated by the asymmetric power sharing agreements, because for β ≤ 1/10− 3ε/5, i.e.,
essentially, β ≤ 1/10, we have d2 = 2 and d3 = 2. Finally, 2’s condition to speak if nobody else
speaks under decentralization is: 2β − ε + β − ε + β + ε ≤ 32(1+3) , i.e. β ≤ 14ε + 332 ≈ 0.09375.
Because this yields the distribution 1, 0, 1, 1, we obtain that it is dominated by the asymmetric
power sharing agreements. 
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 1, we know that all Pareto optimal assignments a
under private communication of common value information entails a single leader, i.e., there is j
such that a (k) = j for all k. Suppose now that communication is public, and suppose that an
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assignment a with a unique leader j is selected. Then, because γj(m) = 1 and γj′(m) = 0 for
all j′ 6= j, condition (4) in Lemma 1 reduces to condition (3). Hence, the set of equilibria under
private and public communication coincide under a. But because the optimal assignment under
public communication a∗ need not entail a single leader, the statement of the result immediately
follows in the case that private conversations are ruled out under public communication. Allowing
for private conversations does not change the argument, because babbling all private conversations is
always possibly part of an equilibrium, and we select the optimal equilibrium in any communication
game which follow the assignment and the choice of communication rule. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1. Define ∆ so that ∆ ≤ 12(I+2) . Since maxj∈I |bj − bi∗ | ≤ ∆ and
∆ ≤ 12(I+2) then, for all i ∈ I,
|bi − bi∗ | ≤ 1
2(I + 2)
.
Next, consider allocation a∗ where all policies are given to i∗, i.e., a∗(k) = i∗ for all k. Since
|bi− bi∗ | ≤ 12(I+2) there exists an equilibrium where all politicians communicate truthfully to player
i∗.
The welfare of any assignment a is determined by expression 2. Consider the assignment a∗ in
which all decisions are given to player i∗. Because all players are truthful in equilibrium to i∗, the
second term of expression 2 is maximized by a∗. The first term is also maximized by a∗ by definition
of i∗. In fact, supposing that any decision k is allocated to any player a (k) , we can write the sum∑
i∈I(bi− ba(k))2 as
∑
i∈I(bi− bi∗ + bi∗ − ba(k))2 =
∑
i∈I [(bi− bi∗)2 + (bi∗ − ba(k))2 + 2(bi− bi∗)(bi∗ −
ba(k))
2] = I(bi∗ − ba(k))2 +
∑
i∈I(bi − bi∗)2 + 2(bi∗ − ba(k))
∑
i∈I(bi − bi∗) and the last term is zero if
and only if a (k) = i∗.
Part 2. Fix {b1, ..., bI} and consider the game with {βb1, ..., βbI}. Consider allocation a∗ where the
moderate political i∗ takes all the decisions, i.e., a∗(k) = i∗ for all k, and let m∗ be the associated
best communication equilibrium. The welfare associated to (a∗,m∗) is
W(a∗,m∗) = −β2|K|
∑
i∈I
(bi − bi∗)2 − |K|RVi∗(a∗,m∗) ≥ −β2|K|
∑
i∈I
(bi − bi∗)2 − |K| I
18
where RVi∗(a
∗,m∗) is the residual variance of decision maker i∗ under communication equilibrium
m∗, and the inequality follows because aggregate residual variance can be bound above by the
aggregate residual variance obtained in the babbling equilibrium, which is |K|I/18.
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Next, consider an arbitrary allocation a 6= a∗ and let m be the associated best communication
equilibrium. We have that
W (a,m) = −β2
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(bi − ba(k))2 −
∑
k∈K
RVa(k)(a,m) ≤ −β2
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(bi − ba(k))2
where the inequality follows because, for every a(k), RVa(k)(a,m) can be bounded below by 0.
Hence, to prove that for β sufficiently high W (a∗,m∗) > W (a,m) for all a 6= a∗, it is sufficient to
prove that
−β2|K|
∑
i∈I
(bi − bi∗)2 + β2
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(bi − bj)2
can be made arbitrarily large by increasing β. To see that this holds note that
−|K|
∑
i∈I
(bi − bi∗)2 +
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
(bi − ba(k))2 =
∑
k∈K
[∑
i∈I
(bi − ba(k))2 − (bi − bi∗)2
]
which is a positive constant and, since i∗ is independent of β, such positive constant is independent
of β. 
Proof of Proposition 4 The proof of proposition 4 proceeds in two steps. The first step shows
that if all decisions are allocated to a single agent, the information of this agent approaches infinity
as the number of agents I goes to infinity. This is formalised in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that biases bj , j = 1, 2, ..., I are i.i.d. and drawn from a distribution of
connected support. If all decisions are assigned to the same politicians i, then the optimal equilibrium
information dIi of politician i grows to infinity in probability as I becomes infinite.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that for any I, the optimal equilibrium information dIi solves the
condition ∣∣∣∣∣
{
j = 1, 2, ..., N : |bi − bj | ≤ 1
2
(
dIi + 2
)}∣∣∣∣∣ = dIi .
We now to show that, for d > 0,
lim
I→∞
Pr (dI ≤ d) = 0.
30
Note, in fact, that:
Pr (dI ≤ d) = Pr
(∣∣∣∣{j = 1, 2, ..., N : |bi − bj | ≤ 12 (d+ 2)
}∣∣∣∣ ≤ d)
= Pr
(
×I−dj=1
{
bj : |bi − bj | > 1
2 (d+ 2)
})
=
(
Pr
{
bj < bi − 1
2 (d+ 2)
}
+ Pr
{
bj > bi +
1
2 (d+ 2)
})I−d
,
and it is now immediate to see that
lim
I→∞
Pr (dI ≤ d) = lim
I→∞
(
Pr
{
bj < bi − 1
2 (d+ 2)
}
+ Pr
{
bj > bi +
1
2 (d+ 2)
})
= 0
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4. 
We now turn to the second step. We compare the expected per-person per-action payoff WmII for
assigning all decisions K to the most moderate politician mI = arg mini
(
bi −
∑I
j=1
bj
I
)2
, to the
payoff WαεN for assigning a fraction αI ≥ α > 0 of the K actions, such that αIK is an integer, to
a different politician jI such that bjI − E [bj ] > δ > 0, for all I. The remaining fraction 1 − αI of
actions is assigned to mI . Hence,
WmII −WαεI = E
[
αI
(
I∑
i=1
(bi − bj)2
I
−
I∑
i=1
(bi − bmI )2
I
+
1
2 (dj + 2)
− 1
2 (dmI + 2)
)]
= αIE
[
I∑
i=1
(bi − bmI − (bj − bmI ))2
I
−
I∑
i=1
(bi − bmI )2
I
]
+
+ αIE
[
1
2 (dj + 2)
− 1
2 (dmI + 2)
]
= αIE
[
I∑
i=1
(bi − bmI )2 + (bj − bmI )2 − 2 (bi − bmI ) (bj − bmI )
I
−
I∑
i=1
(bi − bmI )2
I
]
+αIE
[
1
2 (dj + 2)
− 1
2 (dmI + 2)
]
Since, by Lemma 4, limI→∞ Pr (dmI ≤ d) = 0 for all d > 0, it follows that limI→∞E
[
1
2(dmI+2)
]
= 0.
Further, limI→mI = E [bi] = limI→∞E
[∑I
i=1
bi
I
]
. Using these facts we have that
lim
I→∞
WmII −WαεI ≥ limI→∞α
I∑
i=1
(bj − bmI )2
I
≥ αδ2 > 0.
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This result implies the as I approaches infinity, all decisions are optimally concentrated to politicians
sufficiently close to the most moderate agent mI . This concludes the proof of proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We first prove that full decentralization is never optimal.
Note that if there is i > 1 such that bi−bi−1 ≤ 1/6, then i is informed of i−1’s message or viceversa.
For generic assignments of b, it cannot be the case that
∣∣∣∑Ij=1 γjbj − bi∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑Ij=1 γjbj − bi−1∣∣∣ .
Supposing without loss of generality that
∣∣∣∑Ij=1 γjbj − bi∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∑Ij=1 γjbj − bi−1∣∣∣ , it is therefore
welfare superior to assign a (i− 1) = i rather than a (i− 1) = i−1. So suppose that bi− bi−1 > 1/6
for all i, so that for all j 6= i, di,j (m) = 0 in any equilibrium (m,y) . Hence, assigning a (1) =
b(I + 1)/2c ≡ m∗ yields higher welfare than a (1) = 1 if and only if:
I∑
i=1
(bi − b1)2
I
−
I∑
i=1
(bi − bm∗)2
I
>
1
36
.
The left-hand side can rewritten as:
D (∆) =
I∑
i=2
(i− 1) 1
6
+
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)2 −
I∑
i=m+1
(i−m) 1
6
+
i∑
j=m+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)2 − m−1∑
i=1
(m− i) 1
6
+
m∑
j=i+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)2 ,
where ∆2 = b2 − b1, ...,∆I = bI − bI−1.
We now show that D (∆) increases in all its terms ∆k.
When k > m, we obtain:
∂
∂∆k
D (∆) = 2
I∑
i=k
(i− 1) 1
6
+
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)− 2 I∑
i=k
(i−m) 1
6
+
i∑
j=m+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)
which is clearly positive because m > 1 and m+ 1 ≥ 2.
When k = m, we have
∂
∂∆k
D (∆) = 2
I∑
i=k
(i− 1) 1
6
+
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
) > 0
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Suppose finally that k < m,
∂
∂∆k
D (∆) = 2
I∑
i=k
(i− 1) 1
6
+
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)− 2 k−1∑
i=1
(m− i) 1
6
+
m∑
j=i+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)
= 2
I∑
i=k
(i− 1) 1
6
− 2
k−1∑
i=1
(m− i) 1
6
(8)
+2
I∑
i=k
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)
− 2
k−1∑
i=1
m∑
j=i+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)
.(9)
Because, k < m, evidently,
2
I∑
i=k
(i− 1) 1
6
> 2
I∑
i=m+1
(i− 1) 1
6
> 2
I∑
i=m+1
(i−m) 1
6
,
and 2
k−1∑
i=1
(m− i) 1
6
< 2
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i) 1
6
.
and hence expression (8) is strictly positive. Further
2
I∑
i=k
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)
> 2
m∑
i=k
i∑
j=2
(
∆j − 1
6
)
= 2
k∑
i=2
m∑
j=i
(
∆j − 1
6
)
= 2
k−1∑
i=1
m∑
j=i+1
(
∆j − 1
6
)
and hence expression (9) is strictly positive, concluding that ∂D (∆) /∂∆k is strictly positive.
Hence, we may take ∆ = 1/6, so that
D (1/6) =
I∑
i=2
[
(i− 1) 1
6
]2
−
I∑
i=m+1
[
(i−m) 1
6
]2
−
m−1∑
i=1
[
(m− i) 1
6
]2
,
Noting that for I odd,
D (1/6) =
I∑
i=2
[
(i− 1) 1
6
]2
− 2
I∑
i=m+1
[
(i−m) 1
6
]2
=
1
4
I (I − 1)2 1
36
≥ 1
4
· 3 · 4 1
36
>
1
36
.
and for I even,
D (1/6) =
I∑
i=2
(i− 1)2 −
I∑
i=I/2+1
(i− I/2)2 −
I/2−1∑
i=1
(I/2− i)2 = 1
4
I2 (I − 2) 1
36
≥ 1
4
· 16 · 2 1
36
>
1
36
,
we conclude that a (1) = b(I + 1)/2c ≡ m∗ yields higher welfare than a (1) = 1.
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Having proved that full decentralization is never optimal, we now show the most moderate politician
should be assigned the decision of sufficiently moderate and sufficiently extreme-bias politicians.
Indeed, first note that for any k such that |bk − bm∗| < 1/6, the most moderate politician m∗ is
equally informed as k in equilibrium, and hence it is optimal that m∗ is assigned policy k.
Second, recall that, whenever m(k) 6= m∗, policy k should be assigned to m∗ if and only if inequality
is satisfied. Expand the left-hand side of this inequality as follows:
I∑
i=1
b2i + b
2
m(k) − 2bibm(k) − b2i − b2m∗ + 2bibm∗
I
=
I∑
i=1
(bm(k) + bm∗ − 2bi)(bm(k) − bm∗)
I
= (bm(k) + bm∗ − 2b¯)(bm(k) − bm∗),
where b¯ is the average of the bias vector b. Take k such that bk−bm∗ > 0, the case when bk−bm∗ < 0
is analogous. Note that, by construction, 0 < bk − bm(k) < 1/6. Hence, if bk − bm∗ is sufficiently
large, this is also the case for bm(k) − bm∗ , so that the above expression is larger than 1/36 and
inequality 9 is satisfied. 
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10. Supplementary Material for On Line Appendix: Cabinet Simulations
In this appendix we explore further optimal decision-making authority assignments in cabinet
governments by running simulations for a 7 member parliament in which players’ biases are inde-
pendent and identically distributed according to a skew normal distribution, a distribution chosen
for tractability. Skew normal distributions depend on three parameters which are related with the
three usual moments; mean µ, variance σ2 and skewness γ, where γ controls the asymmetry of the
sampled distributions of ideology draws and σ determines the concentration of such sampled distri-
butions draws. The normal distribution is obtained as a special case when γ = 0, whereas the most
extreme skewness is for γ = 1. Because only difference in ideologies matter for our characterization,
we can normalize µ to zero, without loss of generality.
We first analyze cabinets where the θ is the same for all policies. We calculate two statistics that
capture the degree of centralization of authority: (i) the average number of decisions allocated
to the executive leader – the individual who makes the most decisions; and (ii) the frequency of
draws for which a single leader makes all decisions in a cabinet environment. The results shown
in table 1 and table 2 confirm a general tendency towards centralized authority, which have been
described in large legislatures by Proposition 4. In fact, the average number of decisions made by
the leader ranges from 79% to 100%. Interestingly, the fraction of decisions assigned to the leader
is U-shaped in the variance of the distribution, and this holds independently of the asymmetry of
the distribution, or skewness. Finally, allocating all actions to a single leader is often suboptimal:
the frequency with which a single leader is chosen to implement all policy decisions may be below
50%. An implication is that in most cases centralization of authority in a multi-member cabinet is
Pareto superior to other executive forms.
Next we build on the results in section 8. Having shown there that full decentralization is never
optimal, we now explore optimal government in the case of policy specific information. As in the
common state case, we discuss numerical results obtained for legislatures with I = 7 politicians. The
simulation shown in Table 3 and 4 report the leader’s average number of assigned decisions and the
frequency with which the executive leader makes decisions when information is policy specific. The
results show that centralization of executive authority is not smaller (in fact, usually, it is larger)
than in the common-state case with evenly distributed expertise for given parameter values γ and
σ of the skew normal distribution. Thus, whilst we uncover rich equilibrium behavior allowing for
both single leadership and cabinet arrangements, the optimal decision-making authority assignment
is no more decentralized than in the common-state case. Further, the fraction of decisions made
by the most moderate politician is non-monotonic in the dispersion of politicians’ ideologies.
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Table 1. The Average Number of Decisions made
by the Executive Leader
γ = 0 γ = 1/4 γ = 1/2 γ = 3/4 γ = 1
σ2 = 10 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.99 7.00
σ2 = 1 6.91 6.93 6.89 6.91 6.88
σ2 = 0.1 6.17 6.21 6.18 6.16 6.21
σ2 = 0.01 5.58 5.51 5.53 5.68 5.67
σ2 = 0.001 6.35 6.35 6.37 6.49 6.35
σ2 = 0.0001 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Table 2. Frequency with which the Executive
Leader makes all Decisions
γ = 0 γ = 1/4 γ = 1/2 γ = 3/4 γ = 1
σ2 = 10 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
σ2 = 1 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.92
σ2 = 0.1 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.62
σ2 = 0.01 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.45
σ2 = 0.001 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.69
σ2 = 0.0001 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 3. Average Number of Decisions Assigned to
the Executive Leader when Information is Policy-
specific
γ = 0 γ = 1/4 γ = 1/2 γ = 3/4 γ = 1
σ2 = 10 6.96 6.95 6.97 6.97 6.97
σ2 = 1 6.70 6.73 6.69 6.81 6.74
σ2 = 0.1 5.97 5.90 5.90 5.86 5.75
σ2 = 0.01 6.59 6.54 6.53 6.57 6.55
σ2 = 0.001 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
σ2 = 0.0001 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Table 4. Frequency with which the Executive
Leader makes all Decisions
γ = 0 γ = 1/4 γ = 1/2 γ = 3/4 γ = 1
σ2 = 10 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
σ2 = 1 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.83
σ2 = 0.1 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.29
σ2 = 0.01 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66
σ2 = 0.001 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
σ2 = 0.0001 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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